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H I G H L I G H T S
• A method for automated CVSS risk aggregation is proposed.
• The aggregation can be tailored/trained to domain expertise and uncertain knowledge.
• Results have been verified along an empirical study.
• A method to reduce answer variability and ambiguity in empirical CVSS risk assessments is described.
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A B S T R A C T
Managing risks in large information infrastructures is often tied to inevitable simplification
of the system, to make a risk analysis feasible. One common way of “compacting” matters
for efficient decision making is to aggregate vulnerabilities and risks identified for distinct
components into an overall risk measure related to an entire subsystem and the system as
a whole. Traditionally, this aggregation is done pessimistically by taking the overall risk
as the maximum of all individual risks, following the heuristic understanding that the
“security chain” is only as strong as its weakest link. As that method is quite wasteful of
information, this work proposes a new approach, which uses neural networks to resemble
human expert’s decision making in the same regard. To validate the concept, we conducted
an empirical study on human expert’s risk assessments, and trained several candidate
networks on the empirical data to identify the best approximation to the opinions in our
expert group.
c⃝ 2016 Qassim University. Production and Hosting by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Risk management is among the core duties of the
general steering in large companies. While financial risk
management enjoys a comprehensive set of helpful tools
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and methods, security risk management until today appears
to widely rely on heuristics, (subjective) human expertise
and common practice knowledge. Likewise, compiling
vulnerabilities, known problems and security issues of
components into a concise risk report for decision making
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its impact, to make security manageable. Especially the
quantification is herein a central and crucial issue, as
security is a cost-benefit consideration, and quantitative
measures of security are hard to define soundly. Most of
the related difficulty comes from the inherent complexity of
contemporary information and communication technology
(ICT), which makes a hierarchical decomposition of a
system into smaller subsystems necessary. Upon such a
decomposition, a risk assessment can be applied, either
top-down (in which case the overall risk is broken up into
individual risks for subsystems), or bottom-up, when risks
that are specific for limited scopes are put together into
a risk picture of the bigger system. This aggregation is
then iterated along the hierarchical decomposition up to
the top, where the final result on the risk can be reported
to decision makers for the daily business of risk control.
Unfortunately, the precise process of how to aggregate risks
is rarely well documented nor comprehensively studied or
understood (from a psychological perspective), so most of
this labor is done using rules-of-thumb. More importantly, the
specific ways in which risk is aggregated is often quite context
dependent. Today, these dependencies have led to a large
volume of best-practices relating to many diverse domains.
Risk management standards are in their core a compilation
of such best practices that have been abstracted to make it
amendable to the specific situation at hand. This work is
an extended version of Beck and Rass [1], where a first step
towards a general and flexible risk aggregation rule has been
proposed. One of the few related existing such general rules
to aggregate risks is the “maximum principle” (cf. section
4.3.3. in BSI [2]), which prescribes to take the vulnerability
of a (sub) system as the maximum vulnerability of any of
its components (herein, “vulnerabilities” are quantified as
likelihoods for failure upon any attack from a known and
a-priori identified set of threats).
Obviously, this approach is wasteful on information and
pessimistically overestimates the risk, so that risk experts
tend to refine a so-obtained first guess using their own
expertise and experience. The problem that motivated
this research, was an automated aid for risk assessment
and decision support by “approximating” human decision
making. We propose doing so by using neural networks
(alternatives are discussed in Section 1.2). Our contribution is
a concrete neural network (NN) trained on empirical findings
from a study that queried risk experts on several scenarios,
asking for their informed opinion about the overall risk as
they would assess it in a real process.
1.1. Motivation by example
As a simplified example, consider a subsystem in an en-
terprise infrastructure model, composed from two represen-
tations, given as Figs. 1 and 2. First, we have a physical
dependency model of applications on components (Fig. 1),
which is augmented by the logical dependency model of ap-
plications on one another (Fig. 2). The risk analysis is usually
done in a bottom-up fashion. That is, the vulnerability of ap-
plication A is influenced by the security of its (indirect) ances-
tor nodes VM1, VM2 and their parent AS2. Normally, we needFig. 1 – Dependencies of applications on physical
components.
Fig. 2 – (Logical) Interdependencies between applications.
to account for “and/or”-dependency relations, if an applica-
tion depends on any (“or”) or all (“and”) shown components.
Various industrial standards can help with the assessment,
and our pick in this work is the common vulnerability scoring
system (CVSS; see first.org[3]). Let CVSS(X) denote the 12th
dimensional (real-valued) scoring assigned to component X
that results from the expert rating the CVSS criteria related to
component X in terms of CVSS.1 So, the risk assessment on
application A would start with CVSS(VM1), CVSS(VM2). These
two vectors would then go into the assessment CVSS(AS1).
However, the assessment cannot straightforwardly take the
maximum of the children’s assessments (in a naive attempt
to model the “OR-branch” of AS1 into VM1, VM2), since the
expert has to take into account switching times between the
working and the fallback virtual machine, as well as charac-
teristics of AS1 that are intrinsic to the application server it-
self. Therefore, the assessment CVSS(AS1) only partially but
not exclusively depends on CVSS(VM1) and CVSS(VM2). At
this stage, most standard risk management methods hit their
limits and leave the consideration of the relevant informa-
tion up to the expert. In our case, this means casting the
scores CVSS(VM1), CVSS(VM2) and the information known
about AS1 into a scoring CVSS(AS1). Normally, this is a non-
trivial and fuzzy process.
Abstractly, the risk expert’s task is traversing the graph
bottom-up, where at node AS1, his duty is to evaluate
CVSS(AS1) = f(CVSS(VM1),CVSS(VM2)), additional informa-
tion about AS1, where the function f here represents her/his
expertise, experience and general/personal method to assess
the vulnerability for the application server AS1. This process
is nontrivial to automate, since it assumes the graph to be
acyclic, and a straightforward bottom-up aggregation would
implicitly assume each node to appear exactly once in the
1Note that CVSS does only address confidentiality, integrity and
availability. Accounting for Authenticity and other security goals
is up to a manual addition to the risk management process that
we do not discuss here.
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other components (and vice versa), we have to avoid double-
aggregation of its risk into the overall picture.
For the sake of comparison and consistency (also between
scorings of different systems, say, if the decision concerns the
selection of one out of several candidate system offers), we
can reasonably assume that the risk expert is obliged to make
her/his assessment using a (subjective but) fixed method
f , whose outcome does only depend on the information
available on the system. The method itself may, however, not
change between different assessments, as this would defeat
the purpose of CVSS being also a comparative scoring system.
Our contribution in this work is exactly how to transfer
an expert’s risk assessment and aggregation method f into
an NN, for a threefold benefit: first, we equip the expert with
automated tool support that is tailored to her/his knowledge,
expertise and experience. Second, we assure consistency
among and thus comparability between all assessments (as
there may be very many in complex infrastructures). Third,
we make the expert’s risk aggregation service available to
others, thus allowing to delegate these decisions upon the
so-achieved tool-support.
1.2. Related work
It is quite noticeable that methods of artificial intelligence
have not yet seen much application for decision support
in the security domain, besides only a few exceptions: Kai
Sun et al. [4] for example, show how risk assessment of a
power-supply utility network can be done, based on attributes
assigned to the components of the system. Practically, such
assessments are quite similar to those in IT infrastructures,
with the major difference being the geographic span of the
system. In this reference, the authors use decision-trees
on presumed discrete attributes to derive an assessment of
the overall system (in a hierarchical fashion, similar as we
propose here). In reality, however, security assessments do
not exclusively depend on discretizable attributes, and to a
significant extent rely on expertise and experience of the
assessor. Thus, a decision-tree approach would encounter
difficulties due to vague inputs being required, and due to
the necessity of accounting for interdependencies among
components (which would go into the assessment via the
aforementioned expertise and experience). An NN is thus
appealing for its ability to learn from data, which spares the
human expert a “formalization” of one’s own methods.
Fuzzy logic has been designed to let humans speak out
their heuristics in natural language terms, while directly
producing formulae to do reasoning on that ground. While
appealing in many contexts, risk aggregation is a process that
is often perceived as being difficult to define rules for. More
importantly for our specific application of CVSS is the absence
of linguistic variables, since the scoring is a crisp number
that would need to be fuzzified first (perhaps somewhat
unnecessarily).
These challenges were independently discussed by
McCalley et al. [5], who in their paper seek a deterministic
security assessment method, but back then already identify
the need for tool- and decision-support to tackle this complex
task. Moreover, this reference is among the first to recognizethat a single “measure of security” is insufficient, which
justifies the use of higher-dimensional metrics like CVSS
and neural networks to do classifications and aggregations
in a highly nonlinear manner. Both call for an account of
the “whole picture” (rather than focused local analyses).
We naturally serve this need, as the output of the CVSS
aggregation can easily be cast into color-indicators of
severity, thus offering a graphical visualization of where
problems in a system are most likely located. Although this
related reference also proposes this, their approach lacks an
automated assessment and still leaves the final aggregation
task up to a human expert; a gap that our contribution may
close. Relevant standards such as NIST [6] explicitly prescribe
risk aggregation, but also leave the details mostly unspecified,
thus calling for development of aggregation methods. The
need to do so has a long history, substantiated for example
by Blakley [7], Carroll [8], but also in different fields of
risk management, say the financial sector, where NNs and
support vector machines are used to analyze financial risks
(see Bol et al. [9] or Yu et al. [10]). The field of security metrics
and how to work with them is very active, with a vast number
of different approaches having been defined; see Savola [11],
Ming et al. [12], or Hayden [13] and references therein, to
mention only a few. Some of these are specially tailored
solutions (such as Ming et al. [12]) or general overviews
with huge collection of heuristics and best practices; such as
HEISC [14] or Payne [15]. Common to all these recommended
methods is their usual lack of tool-support and leaving much
of the labour up to human experts. This work is a step
towards automating the aggregation process, which is among
the stages where most human expertise is required.
Another related approach goes for an analytical model,
which divides the infrastructure into (three) perspec-
tives of physical components, the user and the ser-
vices. This division is more general than ours, but in-
cludes the user’s perception of risk in the assessment,
which is not relevant for an internal assessment nor-
mally (and thus excluded from our considerations here).
Finally, Bayesian reasoning appears as a natural candidate for
an analytical approach to aggregating risk. The issue here is,
however, that convergence of Bayesian estimators hinges on
massive amounts of data to be trained on. Ironically, in the
security context, getting more data requires more secure inci-
dents, which is exactly what risk management shall prevent.
2. The empirical study
We asked a set of 50 experts for their (subjective) risk
assessments, based on three different scenarios based
on real-life experience. Practical experience shows that
subjective difference in expert opinions may be significant,
despite the scope of the assessment being precisely
defined and narrowed. Thus, asking experts for a pure
CVSS assessment digs up answers that may be mutually
inconsistent and have a strong variability in the answers.
To reduce this to the end of a “more robust” assessment
result, we defined 10 additional questions on top of the
subsequent CVSS scoring—we refer to this set of questions
as the “meta-metric”. Besides the purpose of reducing the
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how experts reach their votes. The results were anonymized
and the study returned a total of 45 records, from which 75%
were randomly chosen for the training, and the remaining
25% were used for verifying the network performance.
Before reporting the results in Section 3, we first describe
the particular questions that the meta-metric consists of:
Each of the following questions was to be answered in the
familiar terms as the subsequent CVSS, including the option
“not defined” (ND), if the question does not apply:
1. Protective Target (confidentiality, integrity, availability/ND):
which is the security goal of interest? During interviews, it
turned out that the subjective vulnerability assessment is
strongly influenced by whether the expert rates the sce-
nario in terms of confidentiality, integrity or authenticity.
Part of the variation in the data may thus be due to the dif-
ferent presumptions among experts, which the first ques-
tion in the meta-metric shall equalize.
2. Redundancy (yes/no/ND): is the system of interest unique
or is there a backup-copy of it? If so, then the redundant
system may not have the same patch level, thus vulnera-
bilities that are not found in one system may indeed be
found in its fallback version. Thus, the risk assessment
should be on the “weakest” version among all redundant
instances.
3. Application type (input–output/input–output-processing/
input–output-processing-storage/ND): Again, interviews
indicated that experts also differentiate systems according
to whether data is only transmitted, stored, processed, or
if combinations thereof occur. Remaining unspecific about
such details leaves individual experts to their own as-
sumptions, whose equalization by this a-priori question
helps reducing the variations in the answers.
4. Data type (payload/meta-information/ND): often, risk is
quite different depending on whether the information it-
self or only meta-information is relevant. For example, en-
cryption prevents access to the payload, but does not hide
who is talking to whom. The latter is meta-information
that can as well be relevant for risk and vulnerability as-
sessment (likewise, an integrity protection may protect
against manipulation of transmitted data, but it can nev-
ertheless be unwantedly re-routed by altering the unpro-
tected meta-information).
5. Usage (single/multiple/ND): depending on whether a sys-
tem or component is relevant for only one or perhaps
many applications greatly affects its risk assessment.
Therefore, it is useful to have users think about this detail
a priori.
6. Security node (yes/no/ND): some components are desig-
nated to the business workflows, while others are for
pure security services. For example, a firewall has a purely
security-relevant role, as opposed to a file-server, which
is required for the daily business. The vulnerability as-
sessment of the two is, however, quite different, since the
outage of a firewall may be compensated by a redundant
network connection, whereas the file server being down
may cause much more severe business interruption.Fig. 3 – Possible designs for the empirical study.
7. Proprietary (yes/no/ND): do the sub-systems provide stan-
dard or “hand-crafted” individual solutions? Self-made
mechanisms are expected to be much less well-tested and
may have vulnerabilities that proprietary standard sys-
tems may not have (the phenomenon is similar to Kerck-
hoffs’ principle, which prescribes cryptographic systems
to be published in their full details. Consequently, these
“open” systems enjoy the interest of the entire scientific
community, so that vulnerabilities and weaknesses are
identified much earlier than otherwise).
8. Open source (yes/no/ND): open source systems are usu-
ally even better tested than proprietary systems and have
a short patch interval on average. However, the primary
interest of the community is on functional correctness,
rather than security functionality. Thus, although open
source usually provides high-quality systems, a security
auditing or code review for security is quite difficult there,
since the design documentation is usually unavailable.
Hence, and somewhat ironically, although the systems are
open-source, they often appear as effective “black boxes”,
simply due to their high complexity, which makes them
almost inaccessible to a deep-level analysis.
These questions have been added to the CVSS scoring, so that
we obtained a total of 10 + 12 = 22 answers. An alternative
design of the study could give the meta-metric to the expert a
priori, thus turning it into auxiliary information rather than
an auxiliary questionnaire. Such a setup could be used to
measure the impact of the meta-metric, relative to a plain
CVSS assessment. Hence, among the three basic designs that
were possible for the study, shown in Fig. 3, we explicitly focus
on the second of the designs in this work, leaving the third
one as a route for future work on the quality of the meta-
metric itself (design #3 of the study).
3. Training the neural networks
We chose a perceptron configuration, trying to train networks
with one or two hidden layers. The number of nodes in the
hidden layer has been determined from various heuristic
rules. Using CVSS, a risk assessment consists of twelve scores
(assigned by the expert) and ten additional questions that
were introduced for this work only to refine the results.
Towards aggregating two such extended CVSS assessments
into a single (plain) CVSS scoring in twelve dimensions, our
NN has 2× (12+ 10) = 44 input nodes, and 12 output nodes.
We trained (using resilient propagation learning; cf.
Anastasiadis et al. [16]) and tested a total of 13 networks,
whose structure and performance results are reported in
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Table 1. The best network in our experiments was feed
forward and had 16 hidden nodes in a single hidden layer,
together with a bias neuron connected to all nodes in the
hidden layer, and using a hyperbolic tangent as activation
function for all nodes (the respective row in Table 1 is
highlighted). Weights were assigned to all inner edges, except
for the output edges.
Table 1 is to be read as follows: besides the description
of the concrete topology, we evaluated the error rate E after
10.000 iterations, as the ration between network output and
the expected result of the test set, counting the number N
of iterations until the learning algorithm converged towards
an error rate below 0.001. The training was done on a subset
of 75% of the expert test-cases, with the remaining 25%
being validation data, on which the result from the network
was checked against (i.e., compared to the approved expert’s
opinions). We noted “successful” if the value E (“error rate
E after 10.000 iterations”) of successful such verification
among all trials was below 0.001. In this case we have
an automatically approximated result of the test-set, so
that we can see the results of the NN with high accuracy
corresponding to a manual review. An interesting question of
future work may concern the use of other network topologies
not covered in Table 1, say feedback networks or ones with
more than two hidden layer. Overfitting is, however, an issue
to be avoided here, so we leave this direction unexplored in
this work.
Using the network for hierarchical aggregation is then a
matter of feeding a CVSS risk assessment with meta-metric
into the NN, and then re-using its output as input to the NN in
the next stage (we revisit this in more detail in the next sec-
tion). Note that the meta-metric in this “inner” aggregation
stage may indeed be much more efficient and easy to specify
than the regular CVSS metric on the physical entities under
consideration. For example, the protective target (say, “confi-
dentiality”) will remain the same over the entire risk aggrega-
tion; likewise, the meta-metric’s attribute “redundancy” may
as well be an identical input to all aggregations along the way
for an entire redundant subsystem. For a hierarchical aggre-
gation in a given system, the network can be used to do theaggregation in each step. However, it must be stressed that
the network should in any case be repeatedly adapted and
re-trained in order to remain a reasonable approximation to
the overall aggregated risk. Indeed, security audits are in any
case to be repeated, and security certificates naturally expire
(for ISO 27000, the maximal validity period is three years). It
appears thus advisable to use the independent risk assess-
ment thatmay be provided along a security audit or certificate
renewal (for validation of the existing information risk man-
agement system in the enterprise), to re-train the network
towards updating its risk assessment. As such, the network
training should become part of the ongoing security life-cycle,
and in case of ISO 27000, the PDCA cycle (plan-do-check-act).
4. Integrating the network in the decision
process
With the automated aggregation in place, we can now
partially automate a decision process with help of NN-based
risk aggregation along hierarchical aggregation. The NN plays
the role of the function f in the bottom-up traversal.
A crucial point here is the automated account for interde-
pendencies, which is also a central requirement in risk man-
agement decision making. This interdependency comes into
the NN through the expert training data, and therefore does
not have to be modeled explicitly (as would perhaps be neces-
sary for other approaches). Now, integrating the NN as a sub-
stitute tool at the point where the expert would be required to
aggregate risks manually, we end up with a widely automatic
procedure to reach a risk assessment for the overall system,
which can be presented to a decision maker.
Summarizing this procedure, let us assume that there is
a hierarchical decomposition of the infrastructure into appli-
cations that (recursively) depend on others, until the bottom
of the hierarchy, where the physical system components are
located (cf. Figs. 1 and 2 as examples).
The risk aggregation process then proceeds upwards
by invoking the neuronal network for the aforementioned
aggregation function f (cf. the motivating example in the
introduction) so as to layer-by-layer aggregate risks up to
the top. It is exactly the f-operation where the human
expert would be required otherwise. Fig. 4 displays the point
where the NN is integrated in the risk management process,
showing how the process helps to “tool-aided” the risk
assessment.
In practice, the aggregation network should (must) be
adapted to the particular context of an application, since risk
aggregation may look different depending on the system at
hand. Moreover, NNs do not answer the “why” of a particular
aggregation result, which, however, may rarely be necessary
since the NN is trained to approximate human reasoning to
the best possible extent. This drawback of the NN is general,
but nonetheless appears to hardly limit the applicability
and usefulness of the aggregation in the daily business of
security risk assessment. The primary advantage of having
the risk assessment partly automated is the possibility
of “playing around” with different configurations towards
getting a feeling on which investments may be better than
others. So, the security officer as the primary user of this
J O U R N A L O F I N N OVAT I O N I N D I G I TA L E C O S Y S T E M S 3 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 4 8 – 1 5 4 153Fig. 4 – Manual vs. automated risk assessment process.risk aggregation may use the NN on a variety of different
hypothetical (possible) adaptions to the system, to the end
of figuring out the best choice among a set of improvements
that fall into the available budget. The question of the “why”
then only applies to the best solution found in this way, by
which the security officer can resort to her/his own expertise
to explain the effects of the envisioned improvements. Its
results are obtained by the NN, on grounds of prior training
based on expert opinions. When confronting a decision
maker, arguments may thus be easier to settle since there is
a concrete proposal being explained by a domain expert, with
implications and effects being underpinned by the compound
knowledge of several experts (whose input is embodied in the
NN).
5. Conclusions and outlook
Although the task of risk assessment in general and risk
aggregation in particular is usually widely based on human
expertise, surprisingly little effort has so far been put on
mimicking human reasoning within the standardized risk
assessment processes. Tool support is particularly rare in
this regard, and artificial intelligence techniques seem to
offer an invaluable contribution to the recognized need for
decision support for risk managers. This work analyzed
NNs for the purpose of risk aggregation, by proposing to
capture an expert’s intuitive aggregation heuristic into a
neural network. The network is thus designed to resemble
human decision processes as close as possible, to the end
of taking the duty of risk aggregation from the human
expert. This automation and flexibility comes at the price
of different networks arising from different expert trainings.
To retain comparability of scorings, we thus recommend
to train networks on a compound data set collected from
multiple domain experts, so that the NN is not fitted to a
single person, but a group of people. Among several possiblecandidate network topologies that were trained, we identified
a perceptron with one hidden layer to perform best on the
CVSS risk aggregation problem.
The overall benefit of the proposed method lies in the
ease of integration into standardized processes for partially
automated security risk management support (see Fig. 4 for
a comparison). As we were using the common vulnerability
scoring system as our running example here, future workmay
as well target other such rating schemes for risk aggregation,
to extend the capabilities of these (and other) techniques
from artificial intelligence to the IT security area. Very little
has been done in this direction so far, but the indications
found in this work point this out as a promising direction for
the future.
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